

NAVAL WAR COLLEGE
Newport, R.I.


PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION

by
Bruce W. Sudduth
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: 


13 June 1997

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A
Approved for public release Distribution Unlimited

Paper directed by
G.W. Jackson, Captain, U.S. Navy
Chairman, Operations Department

Faculty Research Advisor
D.F. Chandler, RADM, U.S. Navy (Ret)

Approved: 
Faculty Research Advisor

19970815 057

1. Report Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
2. Security Classification Authority:			
3. Declassification/Downgrading Schedule:			
4. Distribution/Availability of Report: DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A: APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED.			
5. Name of Performing Organization: JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
6. Office Symbol: NWC 1C	7. Address: NAVAL WAR COLLEGE 686 CUSHING ROAD NEWPORT, RI 02841-1207		
8. Title (Include Security Classification): (U) PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION			
9. Personal Authors: Lt Col Bruce W. Sudduth, USAF			
10. Type of Report: FINAL	11. Date of Report: 19 May 1997		
12. Page Count: 24			
13. Supplementary Notation: A paper submitted to the Faculty of the NWC in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the JMO Department. The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the NWC or the Department of the Navy.			
14. Ten key words that relate to your paper: Conflict termination, war termination, campaign planning, post-hostilities, termination, negotiations, conflict termination strategies			
15. Abstract: <p>Joint Pub 3-0 identifies the need to plan for conflict termination but our experiences in conflict demonstrate that more comprehensive planning needs to be done in terminating conflicts. The strategic outcome of the Gulf War reveals deficiencies in conflict termination planning. The Japanese planning in the Russo-Japanese War evidenced a clear strategy for ending that conflict. Examination of these experiences provides lessons we can use to improve planning for conflict termination.</p> <p>This is an area where most planning staffs do not concentrate or excel. Our primary focus has been and is the military victory which does not ensure the political victory. The role of military strategy in conflict termination is to end the conflict at the least cost and transition to post-conflict activities to ensure achievement of the desired end state. With current guidance the military planners will continue to face a difficult task in formulating conflict termination strategies. This paper will present recommendations for planning war termination strategies.</p>			
16. Distribution / Availability of Abstract: X	Unclassified	Same As Rpt	DTIC Users
17. Abstract Security Classification: UNCLASSIFIED			
18. Name of Responsible Individual: CHAIRMAN, JOINT MILITARY OPERATIONS DEPARTMENT			
19. Telephone: 841-6461	20. Office Symbol:	C	

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
ABSTRACT	ii
INTRODUCTION	1
DELINERATION OF TERMS	2
CASE STUDIES	4
Desert Storm	5
Russo-Japanese War	9
PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION	11
RECOMMENDATIONS	16
ENDNOTES	18
BIBLIOGRAPHY	20

Abstract of
PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION

Joint Pub 3-0 identifies the need to plan for conflict termination but our experiences in conflict demonstrate that more comprehensive planning needs to be done in terminating conflicts. The strategic outcome of the Gulf War reveals deficiencies in conflict termination planning. The Japanese planning in the Russo-Japanese War evidenced a clear strategy for ending that conflict. Examination of these experiences provide lessons we can use to improve planning for conflict termination.

This is an area where most planning staffs do not concentrate or excel. Our primary focus has been and is the military victory which does not ensure the political victory. The role of military strategy in conflict termination is to end the conflict at the least cost and transition to post-conflict activities to ensure achievement of the desired end state. With current guidance the military planners will continue to face a difficult task in formulating conflict termination strategies. This paper will present recommendations for planning war termination strategies.

INTRODUCTION

Wars do not end of themselves; there must be a strategy for making them end
- Michael Handel

The U.S. experiences in conflicts, even our most recent experience, demonstrate that we have often been less than completely successful at terminating armed conflict on favorable terms. Conflict termination* is an area where most planning staffs do not concentrate or excel. Our primary focus has been and is the military victory—which does not necessarily ensure the political victory. The political objective is a better peace. “The object of war is a better state of peace - even if only from your own point of view. Hence it is essential to conduct war with constant regard to the peace you devise.”¹ The role of military strategy in conflict termination is to end the conflict at the least cost and transition to post-conflict activities to ensure achievement of the desired political end state of a better peace. With current guidance planners will continue to face a difficult task forming and integrating termination strategies.

The operational commander has unique capabilities to plan and focus national conflict termination efforts. The commander’s planning staff already accomplishes most of the necessary work that would facilitate integrating termination strategies into the war plan. Integration of conflict termination strategies into the campaign plan would greatly enhance the probability of achieving political victories.

This paper will compare and contrast how the art of conflict termination was applied in the Gulf War and during the Russo-Japanese war. **The intent is to forge a clearer understanding of terms and to highlight how conflict termination strategies can be integrated into the current planning.**

* “Conflict termination” will be used in this paper in accordance with Joint Publication terminology. When citing authors or other works “war termination” will be used when appropriate.

DELINÉATION OF TERMS

Much has been written about this subject, yet there is little agreement on terms and definitions in conflict termination writings. Authors use the same terms or new terms with different meanings which serves to confuse rather than clarify. This lack of agreement on terms blurs the lines between critical points that planners must distinguish in order to adequately plan termination strategies. First, we must be clear with regard to what we mean when we refer to conflict termination.

Michael Handel, in 1978, addressed this confusion that still persists today by noting that,

The major reason for dissatisfaction with war termination studies stems from the lack of a clear definition of the subject. While scholars tacitly assume that they are working under a common definition, they have in fact different or only partially congruent concepts in mind when they approach the issue of war termination.²

He enumerates two possible definitions of “war termination”, one narrow and one broad. The narrow definition focuses on the questions of when, why, and at what particular point war is terminated and whether this point in time is predictable. The latter looks at a span of time in which a process is engaged toward a better peace with no beginning or end at any point in time.

When many writers discuss conflict termination and planning for conflict termination they operate under the second definition. They are in fact talking about planning for activities that need to be done after conflict termination. These writers’ recommendations to planners actually have nothing to do with war termination but more to do with post-hostilities and nation or peace building activities. Planners must anticipate and plan for these, but first they

must achieve a termination of the conflict that will provide the environment and foundation for post-hostilities actions. Writers often discuss conflict termination as a process and not an event. Conflicts terminate by some action, i.e., agreement or unilateral action. This is an event. The achievement of the better state of peace is a process because no one post-hostility action accomplishes the desired end state. This blurring of the lines and definitions has focused more attention on the last two strategic phases of the conflict but has not substantially helped planning for the actual event of conflict termination.

We can improve planning for conflict termination if we accept only the narrow definition of conflict termination and thus give the planner a definitive event to plan. The second, broader definition of conflict termination should be renamed and placed in the realm of post-hostilities and nation/peace building activities leading to “ordinary” or normal relations between the belligerents.




FIGURE ONE
Strategic Phases of a Conflict

In Figure One I have depicted the strategic phases of a conflict (not to be confused with the operational phases of a conflict).³ In phase one, the belligerents move from an “ordinary” condition to a pre-hostility phase in which tensions increase and extraordinary diplomatic efforts are being made. Ideally, it is during this time that pre-conflict planning (crisis planning) is being done. Then, when and if deterrence fails, the conflict starts (event one) as depicted in phase two. The conflict builds to a point when the belligerents agree to terminate the conflict (event two). Phase three, post hostilities, begins with politico-civil-military activities leading to force redeployment (event three). This phase culminates with the renewal of a greater diplomatic involvement and decreasing military focus. In Phase four all forces will leave at some point and ordinary relations will again be established with the envisioned better peace between the former belligerents. I call this the political victory because this is the better state of peace the conflict was to achieve. I outline three distinct events and four phases that must be included in any complete plan that will achieve political victory. Planners currently plan for the first event, actions that begin hostilities, and are trying to plan exit strategies for the third event, force redeployment; however, they often fail to plan for a conflict termination event. This paper will focus on planning needed for conflict termination.

CASE STUDIES

How successfully have nations planned for and provided the coercive leverage to bring about conflict termination? What was considered in planning for conflict termination? What was done to ensure the military victory in conflict termination supported the political end state? If we compare planning for conflicts such as Desert Storm and the Russo-Japanese war there are lessons that clarify planning for conflict termination.

DESERT STORM

After the parades and celebrations were over, however, the Bush administration found that the war had not really ended. CENTCOM's war in the desert was over, but the confrontation between Washington and Baghdad persisted.⁴

The Iraqi invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 threatened vital U.S. interests in the region, violated the sovereignty of Kuwait and posed a threat to Saudi Arabia. President Bush stated U. S. strategic objectives that remained unchanged throughout the conflict: “Immediate, complete, and unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwait; restoration of the Kuwait’s legitimate government; security and stability of Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf; and safety and protection of the lives of American citizens abroad.”⁵ The military planners had clear political objectives to devise a campaign plan.

President Bush added diplomatic pressure by isolating Iraq from any outside support and forging an international coalition of 31 nations that supported a strong political, economic, and military grand strategy.

President Bush led the efforts of all of the components of national power to include military, diplomatic, and economic. This leadership by the president ensured a unity of command in the conflict. There was a lack of unity of effort because the Joint Force Commander (JFC) did not have the same vision of the end-state as the political leaders.

Clearly, Desert Storm can be seen as a magnificent military operational victory. Whether it will lead to a political victory is debatable. The President, the JFC, and others had different visions of what the region would look like after the conflict. The strategic political objectives were clear but the political end-state (vision) was not clear. The JFC defined the end states in terms of the political objectives: restoration of the Kuwait government and regional stability. The JFC end state vision was an Iraq whose military capability was

degraded and could not again threaten regional stability; this vision did not include Saddam Hussein's removal from power. President Bush, on the other hand, called for the collapse of Saddam Hussein's government.⁶ Where the confusion arose is arguable, but the CJCS also envisioned an intact Iraq with Saddam as its leader. General Powell states "In none of the meetings I attended was dismembering Iraq, conquering Baghdad, or changing the Iraqi form of government ever seriously considered."⁷ The desired end state was seen as Iraq intact with Saddam overthrown; but this was not an objective. The planners used the JFC's end state as the goal for their planning.

When the President's deadline passed for the Iraqi forces to withdraw from Kuwait, the conflict entered the hostilities phase. Massive force was used to drive the Iraqi forces from Kuwait and to destroy sufficient forces to remove Iraq as a regional threat. When the land campaign began, decisive points were achieved with remarkable speed and events came faster than anticipated. By the time the last decisive points were achieved in Kuwait, the Iraqis were in full retreat on the "highway of death." The enemy had long before reached the conclusion that any further efforts would be futile.

On 27 February 1991, at a meeting with the President to discuss the conflict the CJCS stated, "We are within the window of success. I have talked to General Schwarzkopf. I expect by sometime tomorrow the job will be done, and I'll probably be bringing you a recommendation to stop the fighting."⁸ The president wanted to know why not stop fighting today? The CJCS conferred with the JFC. The JFC felt his mission was accomplished in that the Iraqi force had left Kuwait and would not pose a regional threat. U.S. lead elements were reaching their culminating point; casualties were at a minimum but would grow in the next advance into Basra. The JFC recommended a cease-fire.

The allied forces unilaterally stopped fighting at 2400 EST on 27 February 1991. This did not terminate the conflict. The belligerents had not reached an agreement to terminate hostilities. The JFC was directed to negotiate termination of the conflict with the Iraqi representatives. He received his political guidance for the negotiations over the phone.⁹ The sum of the guidance was:

Iraq must release immediately all coalition prisoners of war, third country nationals and the remains of all who have fallen. Iraq must release all Kuwaiti detainees. Iraq also must inform Kuwaiti authorities of the location and nature of all land and sea mines. Iraq must comply fully with all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. This includes a rescinding of Iraq's August decision to annex Kuwait, and acceptance in principle of Iraq's responsibility to pay compensation for the loss, damage, and injury its aggression has caused.¹⁰

The political leaders saw these negotiations as the purview of the military.¹¹ No political leader or advisor attended the negotiations.

The General was to negotiate the conflict termination and secure an agreement that would ensure the political victory. The military victory should have facilitated the ability to force our political will on the Iraqi's at the negotiating table. Had we lost the leverage by unilaterally stopping the fighting? By having a different vision of the political end state could the JFC secure an agreement that would facilitate that end state?

Surprisingly, the Iraqi representative quickly agreed to all allied demands. When asked if they had any requests, the Iraqis asked if they could fly their military helicopters in Iraq. The JFC permitted it with the stipulation they not overfly allied troops. His concern was about the allied troops-not the power to suppress uprisings or threats to Saddam's control. This concession allowed Iraqi forces to put down the very movements President Bush had hoped would topple Saddam Hussein and helped create the Kurdish refugee

problem that continues to plague the region and frustrate the political end state. The JFC also agreed to withdraw allied forces as soon as possible. Giving up Iraqi territory further reduced our leverage to achieve the political victory.

Useful lessons emerge from this experience. First, the planners had not integrated a conflict termination strategy into the campaign plan. General Schwarzkopf stated that he was surprised by how fast the land campaign progressed and was not prepared for conflict termination.¹² The abrupt decision to end the conflict, providing negotiating guidance over the phone and not knowing who would negotiate, all reflect an ad hoc approach to a termination strategy.

A second lesson is that unity of effort is lost if there is not a clear understanding of the political vision. The JFC understood the political objectives but that is not enough—especially if the JFC will negotiate the agreement that establishes the environment of the post-hostilities phase in which the political victory will be secured. The JFC must understand the political vision of what the region should look like when all national power actions are complete. The military victory (accomplishing the political objectives) is the foundation for follow-on actions that will secure the political victory and achievement of the political envisioned end state.

The third lesson of this conflict is that the lack of focus on conflict termination impacted upon the ability to secure an agreement that would ensure a political victory. Growing dissatisfaction with the Gulf War outcome and continuing entanglement in Iraq make it clear that the conflict termination actions did not secure a strategic victory, military or political.

THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Don't you know that if you light a fire, you must also know how to put it out.¹³
General Kodama

In 1904, tensions had grown between Russia and Japan over influence and control of Manchuria. Russia was in Manchuria and expanding her influence in the region. Japan's political vision of the future was Japanese possession of Manchuria, Russian acknowledgment of Japanese paramount interest in Korea, and Russian cession of the island of Sakhalin to Japan. Negotiations between the two governments had reached an impasse and it appeared to Japan that war was the only way to achieve her goals. Lieutenant-General Kodama Gentaro, the Japanese commander, devised a campaign plan to achieve the military victory that would ensure the political vision of the end state.

When the political leadership was ready to make the war decision, Kodama presented his plan. "On the emperor's right along the side of the desk sat the army leaders; on the left were the navy. Behind the desk and facing the throne were the senior cabinet ministers."¹⁴ Kodama was confident that in the early phases of the conflict he would be successful. He planned out the decisive points along the way to the military objectives and where his culminating point would occur. Japan had no reinforcements, and with all of Russia's resources time was in their favor. Therefore, the conflict must end before Japan reached the culminating point. They had to plan how they would bring an end to the conflict in their favor. America was seen as a neutral observer that could bring about a negotiated end to the conflict. "Even at this stage, before a shot had been fired, it was decided to ask the United States at the appropriate moment to act as mediator, and Baron Kaneko Kentaro, a Harvard graduate, was briefed by Ito to leave immediately for Washington, there to establish the closest possible relations with President Theodore Roosevelt and to win the American people

to the Japanese side.”¹⁵ Kentaro was chosen because he had been a classmate of President Roosevelt at Harvard. Japan hoped this relationship would be an additional help in moving the president to help start negotiations. It is important to note the process of unifying the military and political strategies. This ensured unity of command and effort by all national forces.

The conflict began with the Japanese attack on Port Arthur on Feb 8, 1904 and progressed with varying degrees of success. In March 1905, General Kodama returned on a secret visit to Tokyo. “I have come to Tokyo for the express purpose of stopping the war,” Kodama told General Nogaoka, the vice-chief of the general staff. “Why aren’t you doing something?” Kodama asked him. “Don’t you know that if you light a fire, you must also know how to put it out.”¹⁶ Kodama had reached the decisive points in his plan when he expected negotiations to have begun and was fast approaching his culminating point. The political leaders felt more successes could be achieved and were indecisive about beginning negotiations as planned. Kodama informed them he was near his culminating point and negotiations must begin with Japan in a position of strength.

Communications were made to Kaneko, who visited again with Roosevelt. On June 9, Roosevelt invited the two parties to negotiations. Kodama had returned to the front to continue to increase the pressure on Russia to strengthen Japan’s bargaining position. Sakhalin island flanked Siberia and was of great strategic value to Russia.

On July 7 landing operations began aimed at bringing maximum pressure on the Russians and forcing them to negotiate. . . . A month later, Sakhalin was in Japanese hands. As Kodama had intended, this neat little military operation had important political significance. It caused Russia’s only territorial loss of the war, and it implied a direct threat to Vladivostok. Japan’s bargaining position was notably improved.¹⁷

Formal negotiations began on August 8, 1905, which brought an end to the conflict.

What lessons can be learned about conflict termination?

- Kodama designed plans with the political vision of the end state in mind. His focus was the strategic vision of what the area should look like when the political victory was achieved.
- His plans took the decisive points further than the military victory required when he took Sakhalin island. This was a politically decisive point designed to coerce the enemy to negotiate and accept the Japanese vision of Manchuria
- The plans called for negotiations to begin at specified decisive points he felt would drive the opponent to reconsider his cost-benefit calculus.
- The termination strategy and milestones for negotiations were integrated into the campaign plan and set to occur well before his culminating point.

The Japanese military and political leadership understood the political goals and the political vision of what the area should look like when peace was restored. They devised a clear strategy for ending the conflict. They planned to build increasing pressure on Russia by taking decisive points up to and during the negotiations. The conflict termination event was planned and included the specifics of *who* would negotiate, *what* would be negotiated, *how* the negotiations would be brought about, and *when* they planned for them to begin.

PLANNING FOR CONFLICT TERMINATION

The theater commander has the most direct effect on the enemy's perception of cost and risk and therefore, influences his motivations to terminate or continue the conflict.¹⁸
- Michael R. Rampy

Our current planning process develops an effective war plan that ensures a military victory. Updated joint doctrine addresses the need to include termination criteria into the planning and is a good point of departure. However, current doctrine does not sufficiently address definitions or the integration of termination strategies specifics into the plan. "For the campaign planner, conflict termination is a phase of military operations that must be

considered early in the campaign-planning process. Furthermore, campaign planners must plan the conflict-termination issues in full coordination with war fighting.”¹⁹

To integrate conflict termination strategy into the war plan you first must have a termination strategy. The JFC and his staff are primarily concerned with how to best attain military objectives. At best, questions regarding the means of forcing the enemy to end the conflict on favorable terms are secondary. The current planning process addresses many of the questions that provide the criteria needed for a termination strategy. However, the planner must answer the questions from a different perspective, one that seeks to create the earliest opportunity to coerce the opponent to terminate the conflict on terms favorable to the political end state. The list of factors or criteria that the JFC and planner must consider might include:

- What is the nature and type of conflict?
- How does the enemy perceive it?
- What is the objective of military coercion?
- What is the intent and objective of the enemy?
- How does the enemy define success?
- What is the enemy’s overall political and military strategy?
- Is the enemy’s center of gravity political or military?
- What are the potential decisive points?
- What plans, operation and activities will most affect the enemy’s assessment of risk and cost?
- What are the implications for alliance or coalition warfare?²⁰

Planners must also seek answers to questions they haven’t asked before. How do conflicts end? What kind of event are we trying to achieve? Studies have identified various ways for conflicts to end.²¹ Empirical data have shown that two-thirds of conflicts have ended as a result of negotiations.²² Acceptance of this forum as the most likely one for termination helps develop strategies to end the conflict.

Political involvement does not stop with the outbreak of hostilities and continues during the conflict war. Explicit or implicit negotiations continue throughout the conflict. There are strategies for successful negotiations that can be included in planning termination strategies:

Theorists have generally agreed upon several broad principles designed to steer the process of war termination toward successful outcomes, including:

- Pre-conflict planning for war termination;
- Sustaining communications with the adversary even while fighting;
- Employing pauses, thresholds, or “break points” in fighting as opportunities for intensified bargaining;
- Holding forces in reserve as a further deterrent or as bargaining leverage;
- and Demonstrating good faith, even through unilateral gestures as part of the implicit or explicit bargaining that leads to conflict termination.²²

The military supports this bargaining process by affecting the adversary’s cost-versus-benefit calculus, thereby creating an incentive for him to cease hostilities. Operational Art requires the JFC to answer four questions in the course of designing a campaign plan to achieve this victory. What military conditions must his force produce to achieve the strategic goal? (Ends) What actions are most likely to produce that condition? (Ways) How to apply the resources to accomplish the actions? (Means) and what is the cost or risk to achieve this condition? (Risk). All of this begins with the question, What is the better peace that the political leaders want to achieve? This will require greater unity of effort in the interagency process especially between the Department of Defense and Department of State. The current system falls short in providing the best forum for clarity and unity of effort. There is no State Department equivalent to the JFC and his staff for coordination. Especially in a crisis situation, there needs to be designated State department contacts responsible for working with the JFC and his staff for developing a clear end state and post-hostility efforts.

Understanding the political vision permits the planner to determine the nature of the war. An assessment is made of the enemy's intent, objective, political objectives, military strategy, as well as enemy military and political centers of gravity. From this assessment a determination can be made about what value the enemy places on the objective and what costs he is willing to incur to achieve it. A course of action can be determined that will best achieve our objective and influence the enemy assessment of the value and cost of his goal.

Regressive planning facilitates planning not only military decisive points but political decisive points, as well. As these points are reached, the cost-benefit calculus is affected more so than with lesser points along the way. As each decisive point falls it becomes clearer to the enemy that a favorable outcome is questionable. If the staff has correctly assessed the enemy, we can more accurately predict when this pressure will drive the adversary to consider a negotiated way out of the hostilities.

Joint doctrine identifies the need to be dominant during negotiations, "Properly conceived conflict termination criteria are key to ensuring that victories achieved with military force endure. To facilitate conception of effective termination criteria, US forces must be dominant in the final stages of an armed conflict by achieving the leverage sufficient to impose a lasting solution." ²³

In the Russo-Japanese war Kodama's plan included branches for negotiations to begin as military decisive points were taken that would affect the enemy's cost benefit calculus. His plan called for negotiations to be underway well before he approached his culmination point and lost the coercive leverage on Russia. Sakhalin Island was added as a decisive point to increase the pressure on Russia to negotiate a termination to the hostilities and agree to Japan's political vision.

The U.S. used this same planning approach in the use of the atomic bomb against Japan. The planner included branches for negotiated termination between the use of the atomic bomb on each of the decisive points of Nagasaki and Hiroshima designed to increase the coercive pressure on Japan to agree to terminate the conflict.

Planners should include branches for negotiations at decisive points that would affect the enemy's cost benefit analysis of the outcome. If this approach had been used in Desert Storm when the key decisive points were taken (even in the accelerated pace) they would have served as indicators for the JFC to address conflict termination issues with the political leaders. The JFC would have been better prepared to negotiate an agreement that ensured the political victory. Some argue a political or foreign service officer should lead negotiations. Historically it has been the military commander and evidence indicates the commander will be called upon in the future. Nonetheless, the JFC needs to understand what the U.S. will seek to negotiate and why if he is to plan a termination strategy that will ensure a favorable post-hostilities environment for actions to ensure a political victory.

In order to have a complete conflict termination strategy the planners should include in their termination strategy *When negotiations should begin, who will negotiate, how the negotiations will be made to occur, what the negotiations will include and achieve and where the negotiations will occur*. This may sound as if the planners are "scripting" the conflict. A plan is a foundation to start from based on the best information we have. Planners must be flexible and change any aspects of the plan that no longer serve the intended objectives.

During any conflict there is danger that the political objectives or end state will change, which changes the military objectives and impacts the termination strategy. Just as

the military strategy is reassessed (ends, ways, means, risk) after any strategic change so must the termination strategy be reassessed. The integration into the military strategy should be reviewed to determine if it is feasible within the framework of the political end state. In fact, as the decisive points that are termination branches are achieved they should drive a review of the termination strategy to refine it and ensure it still supports the political end state. Joint doctrine states, “Conflict termination should be considered from the outset of planning and should be refined as the conflict moves toward advantageous termination.”²⁴

RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

First and foremost, the JFC must have a clear vision and understanding of the desired end state, not just the political objectives. The vision of how the theater should look after conflict provides the focus for the full spectrum of planning: hostilities, conflict termination and post-conflict operations.

Second, joint doctrine must clearly define campaign events and phases so all planners are operating from the same foundation. Conflict termination should be designated as a specific event that must be focused on during planning. Practical guidance for devising termination strategies must be given. This guidance should include the planning of branches at decisive points for negotiations and the specifics of the event.

Next, planners must devise a termination strategy and integrate it into the campaign plan. A complete termination strategy must include designating specific decisive points in the campaign plan that affect the enemy cost-benefit calculus pressuring him to negotiate. These specified points should include branches for negotiations. They should also serve as indicators for the JFC to begin the review with national leadership of the planned specifics of *who* will negotiate, *how*, *when*, *where*, and *what* will be negotiated.

All of these recommendations will require aggressive interagency coordination and pursuit of unity of effort. The *ad hoc* approach to termination negotiations in Desert Storm is clear evidence all agencies were unprepared for conflict termination and not working together.

If we do not develop complete conflict termination strategies and integrate them into the campaign plan, we will continue to achieve military victories which may not support a political victory. Joint doctrine states the outcome of poor termination planning, “A hasty or ill-designed end to the operation may bring with it the possibility that related disputes will arise, leading to further conflict.”²⁵

ENDNOTES

¹ B.H. Liddell-Hart, *Strategy* (New York, 1964), 351.

² Michael Handel, War Termination - - A Critical Survey. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1978, 10.

³ Figure one is derived from a conversation with Professor D.F. Chandler and his sketch of the conflict bridge between peace states. Colonel Clarke articulates six phases: Dispute, pre-hostilities, hostilities, post-hostilities, another potential dispute phase, and a settlement phase. Colonel Bruce Clarke, "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model", Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 16, Jan-Mar 1993, 25 - 50. Joint doctrine loosely describes five phases of operations: pre-hostilities, lodgment, decisive combat and stabilization, follow through, and post hostilities. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer, Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 30 May 1995, 69. The focus on the military victory is more than obvious as is the complete absence of termination event planning consideration. While this outlining of phases advances the concept it does not help delineate the events nor help planners plan for them.

⁴ Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The General's War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1995), 457.

⁵ U.S. Department of Defense, Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress, (Washington D.C.: U.S. Government Printing office, 1992. Reprint edition. Newport RI: Naval War College, 1992), 38.

⁶ Bob Woodward, The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991, 282. In August 1990, at the start of the conflict, President Bush authorized CIA covert actions to overthrow Saddam. The CIA was to recruit dissidents to remove Hussein from power. Bush publicly called for the overthrow of Saddam. John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 60.

⁷ General Colin L. Powell, My American Journey, (New York: Random House, 1995), 490.

⁸ Ibid., 521-523.

⁹ General Norman H. Schwarzkopf, It Doesn't Take A Hero, (New York: Bantam Books, 1992), 480.

¹⁰ John T. Fishel, Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm, 33.

¹¹ Gordon, 444.

¹² Ibid., 515.

¹³ Denis and Peggy Warner, A History of The Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, (New York: Charterhouse, 1974), 525.

¹⁴ Ibid., 175.

¹⁵ Ibid., 175.

¹⁶ Ibid., 525.

¹⁷ Ibid., 527.

¹⁸ Michael R. Rampy, "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities," Military Review, Vol LXXII (October, 1992), 52.

¹⁹ _____ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 February 1995, I-9.

²⁰ Rampy, 52.

²¹ Stephen J. Cimbala, "The Endgame and War," in Stephen J. Cimbala and Keith A. Dunn (Boulder, Co: Westview Press, 1987), 1

²² Paul R. Pillar, Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process (Princeton, N.J.:Princeton University Press, 1983), 25. A study of 142 conflicts from 1800-1980 shows that 68 percent of interstate conflicts, and 48 percent of all conflicts have ended through negotiations between the belligerents.

²³ Gregory F. Treverton, "Ending Major Coalition Wars, " in Cimbala and Dunn, p 93.

²⁴ _____ Joint Publication 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 11 February 1995, I-9.

²⁵ Ibid., I-9.

²⁶Ibid., III-23.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Brodie, Bernard. War and Politics. New York: Macmillian, 1973.

Brown, John S., Colonel, USA, "The Hundred Hour End Point, an Operational Assessment." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI: 1992.

Cimbala, Stephen J. and Dunn, Keith A. ed. Conflict Termination and Military Strategy: Coercion, Persuasion, and War. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987.

Clarke, Bruce G. "Conflict Termination: A Rational Model." Studies in Conflict and Terrorism, Vol 16, Jan-Mar 1993, 25 - 50.

Clarke, Bruce G. "Conflict Termination: What Does it Mean to Win?" Military Review, Nov 1992, 86.

Filiberti, Edward J. "National Strategic Guidance: Do We Need a Standard Format?." Parameters, Autumn 1995, 42 - 54.

Fishel, John T. Liberation, Occupation, and Rescue: War Termination and Desert Storm. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1992.

Gordon, Michael R. and Trainor, Bernard E., General. The General's War, The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf. Boston: Little, Brown Company, 1995.

Handel, Michael I. War Termination--A Critical Survey. Jerusalem: The Hebrew University, 1978.

Ikle, Fred Charles. Every War Must End. New York: Columbia University Press, 1991, (Revised Edition).

Pillar, Paul R. Negotiating Peace: War Termination as a Bargaining Process, Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1983.

Pinette, Roy R. "Operational Considerations for War Termination." Unpublished Research Paper, U.S. Naval War College, Newport RI: 1994.

Powell, Colin L., General, with Persico, Joseph E. My American Journey. New York: Random House, 1995.

Rampy, Michael R. "The Endgame: Conflict Termination and Post-Conflict Activities." Military Review, October 1992, 42-54.

Reed, James W. "Should Deterrence Fail: War Termination in Campaign Planning." Parameters, Summer 1993, 41 - 52.

Schwarzko^f, Norman H., General. It Doesn't take a Hero. New York: Bantam Books, 1992.

Smith, James D.D., Stopping Wars: Defining the Obstacles to Cease-fire. Oxford: Westview Press, 1995.

U.S. Department of Defense. Conduct of the Persian Gulf War Final Report to Congress. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office., 1992. Reprint edition. Newport RI: Naval War College, 1992.

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff. Joint Doctrine Capstone and Keystone Primer. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 25 May 1995.

_____. Joint Publication3-0 Doctrine for Joint Operations. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1 February 1995.

_____. Joint Publication 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 16 June 1995.

Warner, Denis and Peggy. A History of the Russo-Japanese War, 1904-1905, New York: Charter House, 1974.

Woodward, Bob. The Commanders. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991.